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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. THOMAS HILTON, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Appeal-llarmless and BeverslDle Brror-Instrac-
tions.-In a homicide case in which the uncontradicted evi-
dence showed the crime committed to have been that of mur-
der of the first degree, defendant was not prejudiced by in-
structions defining the degrees of murder, their respective 
elements, and the burden of proof thereon, and a judgment 
of conviction of first degree murder was aftlnned. 
APPEAL from a judgment (automatically taken under 
Pen. Code, § 1239) of the Superior Court of Santa Barbara 
County. Atwell Westwick, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
George Finucane and Gene Harris for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards, Dep-
uty Attorney General, Lawrence M. Parma, District Attorney, 
David S. Licker, Assistant District Attorney, and Thomas P. 
Weldon. Deputy Distriet Attorney, for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Defendant was convicted of first degree 
murder and was sentenced to pay the extreme penalty. Prior 
to the trial, defendant had withdrawn his plea of not guilty by 
reason of insanity. This appeal is automatie in pursoance of 
section 1239 (b) of the Penal Code. 
[1] The commission of the murder was admitted by defend-
ant. At the trial his confession was introduced in evidence. 
He did not take the witness stand in his own behalf, and he 
offered no defense. However, defendant claims that he was 
prejudiced by certain instructions given by the trial court 
defining the degrees of murder, their respective elements, and 
the burden of proof thereon. The challenged instructions are 
substantially the . same as those which were condemned in the 
recent cases of People v. Thomas,25 Cal.2d 880 [156 P.2d 7]; 
People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164 fI6S P.2d 8]; and People v. 
[1] See 8 Oal.Jur. 628; S Am.Jur. 622. 
Kelt. Die. Reference: [1] Homicide, § 261. 
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Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121 [169 P.2d 1]. But here, contrary 
to the situation in the cited eases, the evidenee, including de-
fendant's confession, stands uncontradicted and leaves no 
doubt whatever that the murder committed by defendant was 
murder of the 1irst degree. Under these circumstanees the 
verdict must be upheld pursuant to the constitutional mandate 
requiring that a judgment shall not be reversed because of 
the jury's misdirection "unless, after an examination of the 
entire ease, including the evidence, the court shall be of the 
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a mis-
carriage of justice." (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41h.) 
Defendant, a native of Santa Maria, is 29 years of age. He 
is unmarried, having been divorced from his former wife. 
He is a high school graduate and a truck driver by occupation. 
Sue Fouts, the deceased victim, was a happily married 
woman 41 years of age and a resident of Corcoran in Kings 
County. She traveled to Santa 'Maria on Deeember 2, 1945, 
for the purpose of caring for her mother, Mrs. Swearingen, 
who was 73 years of age and in ill health. About 5:30 p. m. 
on December 5, Mrs. Fouts' nephew, Allan Stewart, brought 
defendant to the Swearingen home for dinner and introduced 
him to Mrs. Fouts. Stewart and defendant had been together 
in theaftemoon and had had BOrne drinks. 
Following dinner in the Swearingen home, Mrs. Fouts, 
Stewart and defendant went downtown and each had a high-
ball. After they returned to the Swearingen home, Stewart 
left, aaying that he thought he would go back downtown for 
a short time. About 8 o'clock in the evening Mrs. Fouts and 
defendant decided to return to the downtown section of Santa 
Maria and look for Stewart. When they arrived downtown, 
defendant, without authority to do BO, secured the truck of his 
employer from a service station where it had been left for 
repairs. He and Mrs. Fouts· rode about town and had a few 
drinks. About midnight they went to the Chew Cafe in Santa 
Maria, where Mrs. Fouts had some Chinese food and defendant 
drank some beer. 
The evideneeas to what transpired between that time and 
the time of the murder is found in defendant's confession, 
made on December 13 to the deputy district attorney. That 
confession was made in the presence of, and was transcribed 
by, a shorthand reporter who testified at the trial. Defendant 
stated that after leaving the Chinese cafe he drove Mrs. Fouts 
to the Rosemary F&l'Dl on the outskirts of Santa Maria. There 
) 
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they stopped and talked about "juke box" records "and 
things." Then defendant drove on "a little ways" and again 
turned off the highway and stopped the truck. Previously 
he had told Mrs. Fouts that she should drive, and had said 
to her, "1 ought to take you out and cut your throat." She 
had laughed, thinking that he was joking. After stopping 
the truck, defendant got out, walked around the side, and 
told Mrs. Fouts to move into the driver's seat. As she started 
to move over. defendant stabbed her in the throat with his 
pocket knife. She gasped; he stabbed "two or three times"; 
and her body fell forward and partially out of the truck. 
Defendant said that he left the body lying upon the ground 
and proceeded to walk around the ranch for approximately 
half an hour. Then he returned to the truck, placed the body 
in it, and drove down the road to the home of one Jack Siler. 
He awoke Siler and requested the loan of a shotgun for duck 
hunting. Siler said that he did not have the gun. Defendant 
then proceeded to the home of one Tapscott in Santa Maria, 
with intent, 80 he mated, of there securing a gun to kill his 
ex-wife. Tapscott was not home. Defendant next drove out 
what is known as the Cuyama-Santa MRria Highway, a wind-
ing, narrow, mountainous road, which waR familiar to him. 
At the wide..<rt point on this road he stopped, took the body 
from the truck, and deposited it down the side of a hill about 
300 feet off the hiQhw3Y. He returned to the truck, and then 
decided to go back'and disrobe the body so as to make its iden-
tification "a little slower." He proceeded to do this, and then 
drove on toward Bakersfield. He stopped at the first river 
crossing. where he threw hh~ victim's clothes off the bridge. 
Subsequently some of the articles of clothing were recovered 
from th(> river by a searching party from the sheriff's office. 
Along the road defendant stopped at a service station in 
McKittrick. wher(> he tried to c1ean his clothes. He then con-
tinued on to Bakersfield. wh(>re hiR truck ran out of gasoline 
and he abandoned it on a Ride road. It was discovered there 
several daYR later by a deputy sheriff. The cab on the inside 
was covered with bloodstains. On the floor there was a small 
hand axe covered with bloodstains and traces of hair like that 
of Mrs. Fou!."! were found adhering to it. 
From Bakersfield defendant hitch-hiked to Trona, where his 
ex-wife lived. His prime purpose was to kill her. He stayed 
around Trona for a few days and burglarized several houses 




He did not succeed in securing one or in finding her. He then 
hitch-hiked to Lone Pine. He assaulted one man who gave 
him a ride, striking the man's head with a bar of metal. He 
attempted to commit suicide, using the same knife with which 
he had killed Mrs. Fouts, but he slashed his wrists too high to 
have a fatal efrect. He was arrested by a deputy sheriff at 
Lone Pine, Inyo County. 
Defendant said that he had no reason to kill Mrs. Fouts, 
and he denied that there had been any semaJ. relations between 
them or any advances on his part. Whether there had been 
sexual relations could not be proved because of the extended 
time the body had remained exposed on the mountainside b&-
fore it was discovered. Defendant stated that the Uquor he 
drank did not affect him. He further stated as follows: 
"Q. When did you make up your mind to kill hert A. About 
a couple hours before then. Q. While she was up at her housc~ 
A. No, it was when we were coming down town. Q. What caused 
you to decide to kill her' A. Oh, I got to thinking. Q. Thinking 
about what' A. I don't know if this is all necessary on this 
case or not. Q. Well, we would like to mow if you could tell 
us. A. I have it all in my other confession. Q. Youean go ahead 
and tell us that. A. I had a lot of trouble with my wife; she 
is my ex-wife, and she has been bothering me for quite awhile. 
Q. Did you tell Sue Fouts about your trouble with your wife' 
A. Yes, quite a bit of it. Q. What did Mrs. Fouts ten 1011' 
A. She just more or less said it was trifl.in.g. Q. Did she tell 
you to go back to your wife' A. No, just to forget it-flhe told 
me not to let it bother me. Q. Did that cause you to get mad i 
nt her' A. Oh, I had been thinking for a couple weeks-I been ' 
thinking for a year of killing my wife. Q. Why were you mad 
at your wife' A. She had me arrested ten times. Q_ For 
what' A. Five times on disturbing the peace charges, one drunk, 
one kidnapping, one rape, one insanity, and one simple assault. 
Q. Where did all this happen' A. In Trona. . . . Q. Who did 
.\·ou commit this rape on' A. I didn't; I was acquitted of the 
~harge. She brought all these charges at di1rerent intervals. , 
Q. This insanity-what was that' A. She tried to have me i, 
committed to Patton. I was adjudged sane. Q. You were ad-
judged sane and they turned you loose; is that true' A. Yes . 
. . • Q. Getting back to Mrs. Fouts, how long had you known 
Mrs. Fouts' A. Probably five or six houl'S. Q. Was Wednesday, 
the 5th of December, 1945, the first day you met her' A. Yes. 
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her; is that true! A. Yes. Q. When did you make up your 
mind to kill her! A. Subconsciously maybe when I was walk-
ing down from the house. Q. What caused you to get that idea 
in your mind, that you wanted to kill her. A. I always re-
gretted I had not kil1ed my wife when I had the opportunity; 
I was all mixed up. Q. Mrs. Fouts never said anything or did 
anything to you, and you had only met her four or five hours 
before? A. Yea .... Q. Did Mrs. Fouts say anything to you when 
you stabbed her' A. She gasped .... Q. As a matter of fact, 
she didn't know you were going to stab her' A. No ..•. 
Q. When you left the Swearingen house with Sue Fouts what 
did you tell her you were going to do' A. I don't know. We 
were both feeling good and were going to go down and look 
for Allan; he had left early. Q. When you left the house did 
you intend at that time to kill her' A. Subconsciously; it might 
have been in the back of my mind. Q. You definitely made up 
:vour mind about 9 :30 at one of these bars' A. When I got the 
truck, yes. Q. Did you decide where you were going to kill 
her-at what place' A. Yes. Q. When you started drivin~ 
out on East Main Street to the Rosemary Fann you deflnitel~· 
made up your mind you were going to kill her. Is that true~ 
A. Yea .... Q. Just how much did you have to drink that nigh1 
before you killed Sue Fouts' A. I started drinking abol1t 
nine o'clock that day. Q. But you knew what you were doing 
all the time' A. Yes. Q. You weren't drunk.A. No. Q. And 
you weren't drunk when you killed her' A. No. Q. You knew 
what you were doing! A. Yea. Q. What reason did you have' 
.Tust tell us the reason, Mr. Hilton, why you killed her. Just 
tell us in your own words what the reason was. A. Like t said. 
I knew for a year, I definitely planned to kill my wife. I had 
it in my mind this Fall; it was always in my mind, and it kept 
getting later and later and I kept thinking about it; that':-; 
an I know, and I know that that day, why, it was on my mine'! 
all the time, Q. It is true that when you start drinking you ge~ 
an inclination to kill some one' A. No, it has always been m~' 
wife I wanted to kill. Q. You do get that idea when drinkinr.? 
A. It's worse when I drink .••• I had been drinking all day, 
and I was thinking I ought to get that gun, borrow one from 
Tap or Bome one on the pretext of going hunting." 
In view of the constitutional mandate (art. VI, § 41h), the 
foregoing uncontradicted evidence must be borne in mind in 
considering defendant's sole contention on this appeal, which 




in instructing the jury relative to the elements of the two 
degrees of murder and the burden of proof thereon." It would 
serve no useful purpose to set forth the challenged instructions 
for, as above indicated, said instructions were substantially I 
the same as those which were discussed and were held to be 
erroneous in P60ple v. 'l'homas, 25 Ca1.2d 880 [156 P.2d 7]; 
People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164 [163 P.2d 8J; and P60ple 'V. 
Valentine,28 Ca1.2d 121 [169 P.2d IJ. It therefore appears 
that the giving of the challenged instructions constituted error, 
and we turn to the question of whether the error should be 
held to be prejudicial. 
Defendant concedes that "the crime stood admitted and the 
malice aforethought was unchallenged" and he further eon-
cedes that the evidence "was suftleient to sustain a verdict of 
murder in the first degree." As we view the record, however, 
there were many other facts which stood admitted and un-
challenged, which last mentioned facts pointed unerringly to 
and impelled the conclusion that the murder was murder of 
the first degree. Thus it appears that it was some time after 
midnight on the night in question that defendant committed 
a brutal, unprovoked murder of a woman he had known but a 
few hours. Despite some drinking, defendant admitted that he 
was not "drunk" and that he "knew what [he was1 doing all 
the time." With respect to the aetnal killing, the evidence is 
summarized in defendant's brief where it is stated: "The 
accused herein admitted uneontradietedly that he determined 
to kill the decedent and walked around to her side of the car 
with that specific intent!' It is therefore clear that the un-
contradicted evidence showed that the killing was "willful" 
as the stabbing was done with the specific intent to kill the 
deceased. But in P60ple v. Bender, I'Upra, 27 Cal.2d 164, at 
page 181, this court pointed out that "it is obvious that the 
mere intent to kill is not the equivalent of a deliberate and 
premeditated intent to kill"; and in P60ple v. 'l'hofn.M, I'Upra, 
25 Cal.2d 880, at page 901, it was stated that "The word 'dr-
liberate' is an antonym of 'Hasty, impetuous, rash, impulsiv{" 
(Webster's New Int. Diet. (2d ed.» and no act or intent can 
truly be said to be 'premeditated' unless it has been the sub-
ject of actual deliberation or forethought (id.)" The question 
therefore remains as to whether the uncontradicted evidence 
showed that the murder was "deliberate, and premeditated" 
within the meaning of our statute defining murder of the first 
degree (Pen. Code, § 189). Here again the evidence is clear 
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and uncontradicted and leaves no room for doubt. While the 
actual killing occurred some time after midnight, defendant 
admitted that he had "definitely made up [his] mind about 
9 :30" to kill Mrs. Fout.s "when [he] got the truck"; and 
further that "subconsciously" that intention "might have 
been in the back of fhis] mind" when he and Mrs. Fouts left 
the Swearingen home about 8 o'clock that evening. Be further 
admitted that before leaving Sant.a Maria, he had determined 
upon the place where he would carry out his nefarious plan 
and that he had thereafter drh'en to that place. Manifestly, 
the killing had been the subject of actual and prolonged delib-
eration and forethought by defendant, the speeifie intent to 
kill the deceased having been formed about three hours before 
the actual killing and having been adhered to throughout the 
intervening time. Under these circumstances, the killing could 
not be regarded otherwise than as an act that was "willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated." (Pen. Code, § 189.) A.. we 
view the uncontradicted evidence presented, the jury could 
not properly have arrived at any verdict other than a verdict 
finding defendant guilty of murder of the first degree, and 
the only real question presented for the jury's determination 
was that of the penalty to be imposed. We therefore conclude 
that the error in the challenged instructions, dealing with the 
subject of the degrees of the murder, may not be treated as 
prejudicial. 
The foregoing conclusion is not in conflict with the deeisiODB 
in the Thomas, Bender, and Valentine cases cited above and 
is in line with our recent decision in People v. Bef"Mrtl, 18 
Ca1.2d 207 [169 P.2d 636], where substantially similar tD· 
structions were given but were held not to have been prejudi· 
cial. In that case it was shown without conflict that the 1tilliDI 
was committed in the perpetration of a robbery and by rneaJlll 
of lying in wait. There, as here, the undisputed faets showed 
that the murder was murder of the first degree (Pen. Code, 
§ 189). It therefore appears appropriate to conclude h.-e 
with the concluding language found in the Bernard ease at 
page 214: " .•. Where the facts impel a conviction of mur. 
der of the first degree ... and do not admit upon any view of 
the evidence of a finding other than of murder of the first de. 
gree. there is no occasion whatsoever to give instructions ~ 
to the differences between the degrees of murder. Bence. 
although the instructions as to such· differences were mani. 
festly erroneous, the errors cannot have prejudiced the appeal-
PEoPLE tI. lIwroN [29 C.2d 
ing defendant." (See, also, PeopZ6 v. PetersOfl, onte, p. 69 
[173 P.2d 11]; People v.Honeycutt, onte, p. 52 [172 P.2d 
698]; Peopl, v. DortntJ'" 28 Cal.2d 846 [172 P.2d 686].) 
The judgment is afIlrmed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J. eoneurrec1. 
EDMONDS, J.-As I read the record in this ease, the chal. i 
lenged instructions did not prejudice the defendant and, for 
that reason, I coneur in the aftlrmance of the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-l dissent. 
It is an unwarranted invasion of the province of the jury 
to hold that defendant was not prejudiced by the erroneous 
charge merely because, in the opinion of a majority of this 
court, the evidence "leaves no doubt whatever that the murder 
committed by defendant was murder of the first degree." The 
fact that concededly the evidence "was sufficient to sustain a 
verdict of murder in the first degree" is beside the point. 
Whether upon that evidence defendant should have been ad-
judged guilty of first degree murder or of a lesser crime, or 
acquitted, was for the jury and the jury alone to say. It is 
not within the power of a trial court, even upon uncontra-
dicted evidence, to direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal 
case, nor is it within the power of an appellate court to direct 
such a verdict by indirection. Yet the majority opinion does 
just that in its conclusion that" As we view the uncontradicted 
evidence presented, the jury could not properly have arrived 
at any verdict other than a verdict finding defendant guilty 
of murder of the first degree, and the only real question pre-
sented for the jury's determination was that of the penalty to 
bc imposed. We therefore conclude that the error in the chal-
lenged instructions, dealing with the subject of the degrees of 
the murder, may not be treated as prejudicial." 
Defendant's uncontradicted account of the manner in which 
the killing occurred left for determination by the jury but 
one real issue (other than punishment), and it was upon that 
issue, deliberation and premeditation, that the utterly confus-
ing and erroneous instructions had bearing. The effect of 
the erroneous charge was therefore to take from the jurors 
the one matter to be determined by them. In other words, '. 
the undisputed facts showed that defendant's crime was mur- '\'~"" ••... der of the first degree, if his sp'ecific intent to kill the deceased 
t , , 
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was earried out with deliberation and premeditation. Whether 
these latter elements were present was the vital question for 
the jury under proper instructions. If the jurors were to be 
instructed in a vein which emphasized the rapidity with which 
thoughts may follow each other, fairness required a further 
instruction placing at least equal emphasis on the true mean-
ing of the tenns dehooration and premeditation. Aa stated 
in People v. Be'fUler, ?:I Cal2d 164, 185 [163 P.2d 8]: 
" .•. While the jury may be told that the brain can function 
rapidly they must not be misled into thinking that an act ean 
at the same time be hasty, hurried, and deliberate, or impul-
sive, unstudied, and premeditated. The extent of the re-
llection in every ease, if it is to pass the test, must fairly and 
reasonably meet the ordinary and unquestioned significations 
of the test words. It is irrefragable that (in cases of the type 
now before us) the statutes of California purport to authorize 
putting a person to his death only where his act of killin:? 
was truly deliberate and premeditated; i. e., was murder of 
the 1lrst degree." 
From defendant's confession and the absence of any other 
evidence of motive it would seem that the murder was the 
result of his confused association of his rancor against his 
ex-wife with all women, 80 that in giving vent to his intense 
desire to kill his ex-wife, he stabbed Mrs. Fouts. There was 
apparently nothing to break this confused conception during 
defendant's prolonged spree of brooding, drinking, and visit-
ing with Mrs. Fouts. It is true that the evidence, if submitted 
to the jury under proper instructions, would have supported 
a verdict of murder of the first degree, but under that evi-
dence it would also have been possible for the jury to con-
clude that the murder was of a lesser degree in that, since 
defendant had seen and been introduced to Mrs. Fouts for 
the first time only a few hours before the killing, apparently 
the intent to substitute her as a victim in place of the ex-wife, 
was not arrived at as the result of a dispassionate, cool, and 
deliberate premeditation, but was the result of~ an impulse 
engendered during the short period the two were together. 
In short, had the jurors been properly instructed, they might 
or might not have concluded that the killing was "willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated," as those terms are used in the 
statute defining murder of the first degree (Pen. Code, § 189). 
A lesser verdict returned by them could not have been dis-
turbed. 
.~ 
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The jurors should have been told in substanee that "Neither 
the statute nor the court undertakes to measure in units of 
time the length of the period during whieh the thought must 
be pondered before it can ripen into an intent whieh is truly 
deliberate and premeditated. The time would vary with dif-
ferent individuals and under dift'ering eireumstanees. The 
true test is not the duration of time as mueh as it is the extent 
of the reflection. Thoughts may fonow eaeh other with great 
rapidity and eold, ealculated judgment may be arrived at 
quiekly, but the express requirement for a concurrenee of 
deliberation and premeditation excludes from murder of the 
1irRt degree those homicides (not specificany enumerated in 
the statute) which are the result of mere unconsidered or : 
rash impulse hastily exeeuted." (People v. Bender, 27 Cal. 
2<1, BUprll, 184-185: People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2<1 880, 900 
[156 P.2d 7].) 
It marks no innovation in the law to state that even where 
there is undisputed evidence of first degree murder, convinc-
ing in the eyes of an appellate court, erroneous instructions 
which bear vitally upon the proper definition of the crime, 
must be deemed to have been prejudicial. Such has always 
been the law of this state. Thus it is said in People v. Vlllen-
eiG (1872), 43 Cal. 552, at p. 556: "We are not justified in 
saying that the error [an instruetion omitting from the defi-
nition of murder in the first degree the essential qualities of 
deliberation and premeditation] was productive of no injury 
to the defendants, because we may be satisfied that the jury 
ought to have found from the evidence, as they did, that the 
defendants are guilty of murder in the first degree. The 
question as to the deliberation and premeditation of the de-
fendants is one whieh is peculiarly the province of the jury 
to determine; and should we sustain the eharge of the Court, 
because of the apparently satisfactory character of the evi-
dence, that question would virtually be withdrawn from the 
jury." 
Again it was said in People v. Chew Sing Wing (1891), 
88 Cal. 268, at page 270 [25 P. 1099]: "There is no question 
arising in a trial for murder more peculiarly or purely one 
of fact than the one whether the killing was done with deh1>era-
tion and premeditation, or in the decision of which 80 much 
is necessarily left to the sound sense, discretion, and experience 
of the jury, who, under the constitution, are made the ex-
clusive triers of that issue. In People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 86, 
Nov. 19461 PEoPLE tI. lIn,TON 
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this court said: 'And we think it to be well settled in this 
state that it was error to instruct the jury that there were 
no circumstances in the ease to reduce the offense below that 
of murder in the first degree. The question whether the kill-
ing was perpetrated with the deliberation and premeditation 
necessary to constitute it murder in the first degree was one 
which it waR "peculiarly the province of the jury to deter-
mine" '_ . _ . Nor can this court weigh the testimony for the 
purpose of determining whether the verdict of the jury is not 
right upon the evidence r quoting from People v. Valencia, 
supra]." 
Here the court did not submit to the jury any issue of fact 
whatsoever on the question of degree; not even in the errone-
ous instructions as to what would constitute premeditation 
and deliberation were the jurors permitted to determine any 
issue of fact. They were told that if there existed in the 
mind of the defendant at the time of the slaying "the spe-
cific intent to take life" then the offense "would of course 
be murder of the first degree." Defendant, by his own ad-
mission, conceded the existence of such specific intent. That 
fact never was questioned by the defendant. Hence the in-
struction that if that specific intent existed the offense "would 
of course be murder of the first degree," left the jury no 
posr;;ible alternative, unless they directly disobeyed that in· 
struction, but to return a verdict of murder of the first degree. 
In this ease, therefore, there was not merely error in in-
structions, but a total failure, in c1fect, to aecord the defend· 
ant a trial by jury. 
For the foregoing reasons I would reverse the judgment. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
I do not agree that "the jury could not properly have ar-
I rived at any verdict other than a verdict finding defendant 
/ guilty of murder of the first degree!' In my opinion the 
jury could properly have arrived at a different verdict, and 
it is not improbable that it would have done so had it been 
correctly instructed with respect to premeditation. The jury 
might reasonably have concluded that because of the con-
fused state of defendant's mind he did not act with premedi-
tation. 
